Why did limited government and 'constitutionalism' (the rule of law, constitutional rules, and political representation) evolve in some societies but not others? Guided by history, this paper examines why this evolution reflects dependence on administrators to implement policy choices including those affecting them. Limited government and constitutionalism are manifestations of equilibria in which the administrators have the power to influence choices. The thesis that constitutionalism reflects an equilibrium among the powerful differs from the prevailing one, which asserts that it reflects gains to the weak from constraining the powerful. Analyzing the determinants and implications of administrative power reveals its impact on trajectories of economic development. Distinct administrative-power equilibria have different impacts on the security of the non-elite's property rights; intra-state and inter-state violence (e.g. civil wars and wars, respectively); policies; entry barriers to new technologies and economic sectors; the nature of political conflicts; and the means to resolve conflicts concerning political rights.
1 E.g. Hardin 1989; North and Weingast 1989; and Myerson 2007 . For recent analyses of political representation in this line of research, see Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Ticci and Vindigni 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Lezzeri and Persico 2004 . See discussion in Barzel 2002 . For social and cultural determinants of constitutionalism see, e.g. Greif 1998; Aston and Philpin 2002; Mokyr 2006. 1 This paper presents a conjecture regarding the origin of constitutionalism, why it was historically insufficient to protect property rights, and why it was nevertheless positively correlated with prosperity. Recent theories of constitutionalism have focused on constitutional rules viewing them as a coordination device that fosters the security of property rights.
Motivated by the interests of protecting their wealth, property owners utilize constitutional rules to coordinate on an equilibrium in which powerful rulers and elite respect property rights. 1 Constitutionalism is thus a means to constrain the powerful.
However, history suggests that constitutionalism emerged to facilitate cooperation among the powerful. Constitutionalism was not a means to coordinate the weak on an equilibrium constraining the powerful but was an observable implication of particular equilibria among th powerful. Specifically, constitutionalism reflects equilibria in which those with the administrative capacity to implement or counteract policy choices had to take into account each other's preferences when making choices. Roughly speaking, constitutionalism served as a means to facilitate cooperation and decision-making among the powerful while reducing costly, on-the-equilibrium-path conflicts among them. Administrative equilibria determined which, if any, the three main features of constitutionalism (i.e. constitutional rules, the rule of law and political representation) emerged and with respect to whom.
The premise of the analysis is that policy choices are nothing but a wish without an administration to implement them. An administration is composed of individuals and organizations that are directly involved in the implementation of military, financial, legal or other policy choices (e.g. a professional or citizens' army, militias, tax farmers, the IRS, feudal lords, self-governed provinces and cities, tribes, and lineages). An effective administration has the organizational capacity to execute policy choices by acting on the ruler's behalf (e.g. assembling an army, advancing loans, collecting taxes, or dispensing justice), making policy choices publically known, monitoring behavior, and punishing deviators.
Among its other tasks, an administration is a means to retaliate against those refusing to comply with policy choices. Administrators therefore can be in the particularly advantageous position of defying those who make policy choices (the 'ruler' or 'political elite') while, at the same time, reducing these choice-makers' capacity to retaliate against them. Indeed, military, financial, and legal administrators often have defied rulers and thereby influenced outcomes.
Administrative power is the extent to which the ruler's choices and outcomes are influenced by potential defiance by those with administrative capacity.
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A necessary condition for administrative power is that it is costly for the ruler to replace the administrators. Environmental and technological factors influence this cost, but so are cultural factors reflecting multiple equilibria in the loyalty and legitimacy relations among the administrators, their agents, and the ruler. Equilibria with different levels of administrative power therefore exist.
3 (Section I.)
When the administrative equilibrium entails sufficiently high power, the ruler's and administrators have self-enforcing rights and constitutionalism is Pareto-optimal for them.
Constitutional rules and due process and equality before the law reduce costly conflicts caused by information problems and political assemblies foster cooperation (and particularly coordination on implementable choices). In such cases, the elite -those with formal influence over policy choices -include the ruler and the administrators. (Section II present the argument and section III provides historical evidence.)
For ease of exposition, the argument abstracts from important issues. It implicitly assumed that gains from cooperation among the ruler and administrators are sufficient to prevents the state from disintegrating and that we can consider the powerful administrators as one agent. Hence, the argument ignores, for example, possible collective action problems or individuals or groups with equilibrium administrative capacity who refrain from cooperating via 5 E.g. North 1982 North , 1990 Bates, 1991; Bates et. al. 2002; Olson 1993; Acemoglu et. al. 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006 . Among the notable exceptions are Greif 1994 Greif , 1998 Greif , 2005 Egorov and Sonin 2006. 6 Previous important analyses of the impact of economic or coercive powers on the rule of law assumed that agents are endowed with the ability to sanction a ruler rather than considering it as endogenous. E.g. Olson 1993; Bates 1991; Bates et al. 2002; Barzel and Kiser 1997; Haber et al. 2003; Skaperdas 1992. 4 constitutionalism complements prosperity by providing a means for collective decision making and for peacefully providing political voice and influence to a new economic group. This paper differs from the more common choice-theoretic approaches to institutional development because it considers institutional development as reflecting the strategic problems associated with implementation differentiates. The choice-theoretic approach assumes that rulers' choices correspond to outcomes and it abstracts from the need to implement these choices. 5 Although this assumption is often useful, we can gain from combining the analysis of choice with that of implementation. (Greif 2005.) Indeed, choices and implementation are interrelated: implementing choices requires an administration and powerful administrators influence choices. 6 Similarly, focusing on constitutions as an equilibrium institutions (as in Greif 2006) reflecting self-enforcing institutional outcome differentiates this paper from the literature on administration. This literature studies how agency problems determine a ruler's optimal administrative forms (e.g. Levi 1989; Kiser 1999; Dixit 2006) ; how the interactions between politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups influence policy choices in democracies (e.g.
McConnell 1966); and what determines bureaucratic effectiveness (e.g. Wilson 1991; Evans and
Rauch 1999). These important lines of work have taken legal and political institutions as given, while this paper considers them as endogenous equilibrium outcomes.
Considering the ruler-administrators strategic problem also differentiates this paper from the literature examining administration as a function of the relations among social groups (e.g. Greif 1998 ), or among rulers and their subjects (e.g. Levi 1989; Kiser 1999; Arias 2007 ). More generally, while Weber (1987) and Tilly (1990) among others, asserted that intra-state administrative growth is due to inter-state warfare, here the analysis highlights the reverse causal 7 Weakness is vis-à-vis the ruler and not necessarily other members of the society.
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relations. Administrative equilibria influence the growth of the state -whether or not it disintegrates or consolidates -and whether violence prevails within or between states.
The analysis in this paper is highly preliminary. It neither provides an explicit model nor conducts an empirical test, or rigorously integrates important considerations such as technological changes or environmental factors. As such, it represents the beginning rather than the end of a research agenda. Its only aim is to highlight the merit of developing the political economy of implementation that contends with the implications of the necessity of governing via administrators. Its key insight is that distinct initial endowments of administrative power can have profound implications for historical trajectories of institutional and economic developments.
I. Administration and Administrative Power
This section defines the term administration as it is used in this paper. It then differentiates between powerful administrators (or 'powerful administrations') who can sanction a ruler using their administrative capacity and weak administrators (or 'ruler-controlled administrations') who cannot. 7 It concludes by considering the technological, strategic, and structural determinants of administrative power and why multiple administrative equilibria are possible.
Administration
Kings, dictators, landlords, elected leaders, aristocrats, generals, and merchants have been, at different time and places, members of the political elite, namely, those with formal and effective influence over policy choices. The analysis here considers the membership of this elite as endogenous to the administrative equilibrium. For simplicity of exposition, however, suppose at this point that there is a 'ruler' who makes policy choices regarding the internal and external affairs of the state. These include the distribution of political, legal, and economic rights, the processes for making legal and political decisions, and foreign policy.
Whether the policy-maker is a person (such as a king, dictator, or president) or a group (such as a tribe, party, ethnic group, oligarchy, republic, or theocracy), governing requires
administration. An administration is composed of individuals and organizations that are directly 8 This argument about distinct preferences over choices differs from the argument that commitment failure is the source of failure in political bargaining (e.g. Greif 1994; Fearon 1997; Nye 1997; Acemoglu 2003 Because rulers have only limited physical capacity to implement policy choices, the administration at their disposal determines which of their choices will be implemented. For example, federal authorities choose tax rates but the effectiveness of the IRS determines how much tax revenues are actually collected. Similarly, a ruler might choose to have an army of a certain size but an administration is necessary to implement this choice. It must obtain the necessary funds, solicit recruits, and then equip, train and maintain them.
In studying the impact of administrations on developmental processes, it is useful to adopt the broader definition stated above rather than to equate administrations with bureaucracy.
Throughout history, administrations have taken a wide variety of forms, including citizens' militias, mercenaries, feudal lords, warlords, privateers, tax farmers, modern bureaucracies, temples, parishes, and self-governed provinces, colonies, cities, tribes and clans.
Administrative power
Ignoring incentive issues, administrators can use their administrative capacity to 'sanction the ruler' by withdrawing their services, implementing another choice, or using their administrative capacity against him. (Henceforth, the term 'sanction' refers to any of these actions.) Historically, administrators sometimes refused to implement choices of even seemingly mighty rulers such as Frederick Barbarossa (d. 1190) who was the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the king of Germany, Italy, and Burgundy, and the Duke of Swabia. In 1174 Barbarossa prepared a campaign against the Italian city-republics and asked one of his feudal lords, Henry the Lion, the Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, to send out his troops. However, Henry declined and used his troops to secure his domain's Eastern borders instead. (Moe 2005) . Groups with independent administrative capacity, even if not used by the ruler, are relatively effective in influencing the costs of implementing policy choices. The distribution of organizational capacity at the disposal of the ruler and other actors impacts the cost of implementing various policy choices and hence their net benefit to the ruler.
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Administrators have administrative power when their capacity to sanction a ruler influences his choices. Having influence requires the threat of sanctioning to be credible and the sanction to be sufficiently large. The larger the set of choices on which the administrators can have influence, the higher is their power. Attempts to pre-empt power also influence choices. For example, after the American Revolution of 1776 revealed the administrative power of selfgoverned colonies to Britain, it attempted to establish Crown Colonies instead.
Individuals and organizations that are not part of the state's administration also might have the capacity to sanction rulers. The expectations of such sanctions might influence rulers' choices (e.g. Greif 2005) . Choices made by Chinese Emperors reflect their concerns about mass peasant revolts, while those of elected officials in democracies often reflect their concerns with future votes by members of organized groups.
9 Still, there is an important distinction between the sanctioning capacities of administrators and non-administrators. To sanction the ruler, nonadministrators have to take action (e.g. revolt or vote) while potentially facing a repressive administration. In contrast, powerful administrators can impose costs on a ruler through inaction and face only a state apparatus that has been weakened because of their inaction. Powerful administrators thus have a comparative advantage in sanctioning rulers.
Self-enforcing Administrative Power
Different levels of administrative power can be equilibrium outcomes for a given environment and technology. Multiple equilibria exist because administrative power increases with the ruler's cost of replacing incumbent administrators, while this cost increases with administrative power. (By 'replacing administrators,' I also mean creating an alternative administration.) To see why this is the case ignores, for simplicity, considerations such as collective action problems, heterogeneity in administrators' preferences, and asymmetric information.
10 By first-best I mean their optimal choice given the technological and strategic costs of implementation.
11 Even if they have perfect substitutes, however, the multiplicity of equilibria implies that they can have power. There can be an equilibrium in which the new administrators are expected not to implement the choice either. they were sufficiently powerful to prevent Barbarossa from becoming stronger.
The high costs of replacing administrators render them powerful, and that power can be used to prevent policies reducing replacement costs. Similarly, low replacement costs imply weak ('ruler-controlled') administrators who cannot prevent choices that keep these costs low. Thus, there are at least two administrative equilibrium structures, one with weak and the other with strong administrations. 12 In between, these two structures, there are likely to be others in which neither side will find it beneficial to unilaterally change the structure. Once an administrative equilibrium corresponding to any one of these many equilibria prevails, it is self-enforcing. In such cases, the administrative structure -whether commissioned by a ruler, created by the administrators, or inherited from the past -will perpetuate.
Although focusing on administrative equilibria is analytically useful and empirically relevant, it is intuitive that administrative equilibria -particularly those with powerful administrators -are generally unstable. A distribution of administrative power is likely to be an equilibrium in only relatively small set of parameters and hence correspondently small exogenous shocks are likely to cause this distribution to cease being an equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, administrative equilibria tend to undermine themselves, in the sense of leading to changes that render them self-enforcing in small set of parameters. In addition, information and coordination problems provide opportunities to rulers and administrators to shift the equilibrium in their favor.
The discussion below illustrates the fragility of administrative equilibria and the associated dynamics. (See general discussion in Greif 1998 and 2006, chapter 6.) Rulers with limited administrative capacity, however, might benefit from increasing administrative power when it fosters their ability to commit. A ruler who cannot take at will, need others to be willing to provide him. Another possible notion of legitimacy is that of a 'figurehead' ruler: It is common knowledge that no (potential and actual) administrator will follow the behavior the ruler ordered against another administrator. In this case, the cost to the ruler of replacing an administrator is infinite.
More generally, there can be notions of legitimacy between these two extremes.
Specifically, it can be common knowledge that each administrator believes that everyone else will not mobilize their administrative capacity against a defiant administrator in some situations.
Indeed, this 'limited ruler' notion of legitimacy might also specify the situations under which the administrators will collectively sanction the ruler. Ceteris paribus, the cost of replacing a defiant administrator in these situations is therefore higher. The cost of replacing administrators is also endogenous to administrative practices. For example, if the same administrative service is provided by relatively many administrators then, ceteris paribus, the cost of replacing each of them is lower than it would otherwise have been.
Choosing administrators from different cultures and with diverse interests has the same impact in that it reduces their ability to coordinate and credibly commit to sanction the ruler. The cost of replacing an administrator also declines with more frequent geographical rotations of administrators, which undermine their ability to cultivate loyalty among the local citizenry.
Finally, greater uniformity of administrative training, tasks, and routines render administrators closer substitute to each other and hence lowers the cost of replacing an administrator. Federal Reserve is a centralized and powerful administrator as it is controlled by a board that 14 There is a rich literature that examines the relations between military or production technology and the rights that one can personally secure as an equilibrium outcome when facing a predatory ruler (e.g. Olson 1993 ). This work differs in considering the institutional (non-technologically) determined foundations of the rule of law as an equilibrium outcome. For previous analyses in this spirit, see Greif 1994 Greif , 1998 Bates, et. al. 2002. 13 cannot be arbitrarily replaced by the White House and Congress. The ideal type of Weberian bureaucracy, in contrast, is centralized but weak.
II. The Origin of Limited Government and Constitutionalism
This section discusses why and how administrative power leads to limited government and constitutionalism, that is, the rule of law, constitutional rights, and political representation. It argues that constitutionalism is an observable implication of administrative equilibria with powerful administrators.
Limited Government and Constitutional Rules
A limited government is one in which the ruler is constrained from arbitrarily assigning rights. When the administrators are powerful, they will have some rights as an equilibrium outcome. There are rights that the ruler will prefer them having then confronting them and triggering sanctions The more power administrators have, the more rights they can secure for themselves. 14 (The ruler's power, if any, comes from his control over the 'weak' component of his administration.)
Limited 'government' -in which rulers respect pre-determined customary, legal, explicit, or implicit rights -is an equilibrium outcome reflecting a balance of administrative power.
Constitutional rules -charters, golden bulls, constitutions, political traditions, or basic lawsspecify such rights to reduce misunderstandings and hence conflicts along the equilibrium path.
The discussion implicitly assumed that the relative power of the ruler and the administrators is common knowledge. In reality, though, asymmetric information about the sides' powers is likely to prevail. Furthermore, constitutional rules have implications beyond reducing conflicts: they also determine the allocation of gains from fewer conflicts. For these reasons, conflicts that reveal relative power and select among rules are likely to transpire.
15 These 37 clauses remained in force despite the decline in the Crown's power vis-a-vis the Parliament probably because the Crown never regained the rights that were relinquished in the Magna Carta.
14 The history of the Magna Carta reflects this argument: that rights and constitutional rules must be self-enforcing to be followed and conflicts are a means of revealing relative power through which self-enforcing rules are selected. The first version of the Magna Carta was imposed on King John in 1215 by the Barons, who demanded and obtained many rights when he was militarily unprepared for confrontation. In particular, they imposed 'clause 61' upon him, which specified that kings must swear an oath of loyalty to an independent baronial committee that could overrule their decisions, through force if necessary.
Later events indicate that clause 61 was not self-enforcing, although the barons may have hoped to make it so by forcing King John to swear in God's name to keep it. Subsequently, John asked for, and received from the Pope, an annulment of his oath, gathered his forces, and invalidated the Magna Carta. The later version of the Magna Carta, confirmed by King Henry III in 1225, remained in force into the 19 th century, and excluded clause 61. Indeed, it contained only 37 clauses. Those that were not self-enforcing did not last.
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Equality and Due Process Before the Law
The causal relationship between administrative equilibria and equality and due process before the law are due to two factors. First, conflicts are costly to both the ruler and the administrators. Second, there is imperfect public information. Specifically, if the ruler makes legal decisions, there is a positive probability that the administrators will interpret them as aimed at transgressing on their rights or reducing their power.
In such repeated, imperfect monitoring games the characteristics of equilibria are well known. Costly conflicts will occur on-the-equilibrium-path whenever the administrators interpret a ruler's legal decision as aimed to gain power. If the cost of conflicts is high, both rulers and administrators gain from adopting decision-making processes that improve the quality of information and reduce the likelihood of conflicts.
Information improves by instituting equality and due process before the law, because legal decisions and processes are uniform and conditional on the objective attributes of the situation, not on the identity of the litigants. By relinquishing discretion and respecting legal procedures with outcomes he does not control, the ruler signals that the legal decision is not aimed at influencing power. Some constitutional rules -particularly those specifying processes for making decisions -similarly reduce the possibility of costly misinterpretation of choices (Greif 2006) .
Rulers facing powerful administrators have often behaved in a manner consistent with this argument. Even before the Magna Carta (1215) affirmed the English Barons' rights to be tried by their peers, the English kings followed this procedure. The Magna Carta also specified processes for trial by one's peers and handling fiefdoms that were under the supervision of regents or widows rather than an adult male lord. Similarly, Barbarossa followed the rule of law before attacking Henry. He had sought legal consent for the attack from a council of Dukes and attacked only after they had found Henry guilty of insubordination and declared him an outlaw. This process, most likely, was about clarifying Barbarossa's intentions rather than justice. The territory captured from Henry was given to other Dukes, thereby retaining the balance of power between them and Barbarossa.
Political Representation
Constitutional and other rules specifying rights inherently are incomplete 'contracts.'
Hence, the rights and choices they specify are not likely to remain optimal to both sides as time
passes. Yet, because these rules are an equilibrium outcome, neither side can unilaterally alter them without risking conflict. For example, a ruler risks costly retaliation if he increases taxes based on private information regarding a forthcoming external attack.
When past rights and choices are no longer optimal to both sides, their re-adjustment is mutually beneficial. Both the ruler and administrators can gain from coordinating on changing rights or taking other actions. Such Pareto improving changes may be procedural (e.g. specifying a process to determine tax rates), quantitative (e.g. change in the tax rates), and/or structural and aimed at keeping the balance of power (e.g. creating militia to balance an increase in a ruler's military strength). The Magna Carta, for example, specified the process by which the king can request the imposition of a higher tax and a Baronial council to supervise his actions.
Political assemblies are means for changing rights and making choices in order to achieve Pareto optimal outcomes for the ruler and administrators. They facilitate revealing private 16 E.g. Bates 1991; Hoffman and Norberg 2001; Barzel and Kiser. 1997; Barzel 2002. 17 Myerson (2007) argues that political representation are established by rulers when they can gain from the implied better ability to coordinate actions against them. 16 information, changing rights, adjusting choices, and cooperating. These assemblies will be composed of individuals with administrative capacity (e.g. nobles), the leaders of hierarchical structures (e.g. tribal leaders), or the elected representative of horizontal structures (e..g, officials of self-governed cities). 16 However, assemblies are costly to rulers because they increase administrative power by fostering coordination among the administrators. Aristotle, for one, noted that tyrants "don't allow
[even] associations for social and cultural activities or anything of that kind; these are the breeding grounds of independence and self-confidence, two things which tyrants must guard against" (Politics 5.11).
17 Thus, if the ruler does not gain much from changing rights and making new choices, he is better off without representative assemblies.
Hence, states with powerful administrators will have assemblies representing them, but only if they face an unstable environment that requires periodical adjustment of rights and choices. In that case, the elite will be composed of the ruler and the administrators. States with very powerful administrators are unlikely to have assemblies, as these states disintegrate -unless, due to external threats or other factors, the administrators can gain from cooperation via the state.
(I will return to this issue below.) Finally, states with weak administrators will not have representative assemblies (although rulers may still rely on various advisory councils). The elite (those with formal influence over policy choices) will be the ruler and his close aides.
III. The Origin of Limited Government and Constitutionalism: History
While relevant evidence has yet to be systematically collected, a cursory historical examination confirms the relevance of the argument above and its predictions. In the late medieval period, constitutional monarchies and republic were the norm, not the exception, in (Herb 2003.) Consistent with the conjecture regarding the administrative origin of constitutionalism, these political assemblies were composed of individuals and corporate bodies with independent administrative capacity (e.g. feudal lords and self-governed cities), or they had a standing committee with administrative power. Interestingly, although Japan also had powerful administrators under the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603 to 1868) it did not have an assembly. This is consistent with the argument that assemblies are established in response to the need to adjust rights. Japan did not face external military threat and its international trade was very limited implying it had less need for adjusting rights.
The timing of European constitutionalism also lends support to the conjecture that it is an equilibrium outcome in the relations between rulers and powerful administrators. The latemedieval European states were established by rulers who had little administrative capacity. Their abilities were so meager that many of them could not even support a stationary court and had to travel throughout their kingdoms to consume local products as late as the 11 th century. "The travels of the Holy Roman Emperor Conard [for that reason] in 1033 were fairly typical. He traveled some 1600 miles" (Webber et. al., 1986: 168 Consistent with the argument that administrators' rights are an equilibrium outcome reflecting a balance of power, they were adjusted in France when the balance changed. This happened when the first Bourbon, Henry IV, was crowned in 1589. Because he was a powerful administrator (governing Navarre), his ascension to the throne shifted the balance of power in favor of the crown. Indeed, Henry embarked on a campaign to take rights away from administrators, particularly through the use of intendants to check the provisional governments.
Subsequent kings continued weakening these nobility-controlled governments, particularly from 1621-1661. The role of the intendants, for example, was expanded from supervision to tax collection.
The previously powerful administrators often attempted to prevent the further undermining of their power in various ways. The feudal nobility and the officers of the Parlement of Paris often revolted, but the series of failed revolts, known as the Fronde (1648-1653) revealed the new balance of power. In the absence of powerful administrators, there was no need for the Estates-General, and it was not summoned after 1615. It was next summoned in 1789 when the Crown faced a financial crisis reflecting its limited success in creating an effective, yet weak, administration.
The histories of Russia and Poland similarly illustrate that constitutionalism rises and falls with administrative power and that whether a weak or a strong administration prevails will depend on the initial administrative endowment rather than technology or environment. Despite their similar endowments, Russia's constitutionalism declined over time while Poland's increased.
As 18 On incentives to introduce reinforcing institutional elements that make a Pareto-optimal allocation self-enforcing, see Greif 1998 Greif , 2006 20 natural endowments of Russia and Poland, the former was an autocracy and the latter was a constitutional monarchy from its inception until 1795 (when it was partitioned by other powers).
This distinct institutional trajectory seems to reflect a different process of state formation.
Polish kings did not initially function as tax collectors, supported by an occupying military force.
Instead, they consolidated -but did not conquer -an area governed by local aristocracies. These aristocrats did not provide the kings with the resources required for creating a ruler-controlled administration. After 1572, for example, the king was forbidden to dismiss any official, and his army was restricted to 3000 men, while various Magnates' armies were larger. (The next section provides additional details.)
The rule of law, constitutions, and political assemblies historically have been the observable implications of an equilibrium with powerful administrators. They were means for reducing conflicts and gaining from adjusting rights, and for making choices in the presence of administrative power. Clearly, constitutional institutions can emerge for similar reasons when rulers face other powerful actors and social groups. Yet, the comparative advantage of powerful administrators in sanctioning rulers, as well as the historical evidence, suggests that administrative power has been particularly important in leading to constitutionalism in Europe.
IV. Why is Constitutionalism Insufficient for Prosperity?
This section argues that when constitutionalism is an equilibrium underpinned by administrative power, it is insufficient for prosperity because the rights of the non-powerful are not necessarily secured, while the policies are biased by power considerations and the interests of the powerful.
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History is often invoked to claim that constitutionalism is sufficient for prosperity. Premodern constitutional states secured the property rights necessary for markets thereby leading to modern economic growth. England became the canonical example: according to this interpretation of English history, it prospered after the Glorious Revolution (1688) because the constitutionalism that followed secured rights and promoted markets (North and Weingast 1989 ). Poland is an example of a constitutional monarchy that, although older than England's, is neither known for its prosperity nor for leading the transition to modern economies. Its kings were elected, and a political assembly (sejm) had probably existed since the 12 th century, representing the nobles, clergy, and elected local representatives. Under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569-1795), elections to the assembly were held every other year. The assembly was summoned every year and operated under a set of constitutional rules, elected the king, and made final decisions about legislation, taxation, budgets, and foreign affairs.
Poland's experience suggests why constitutionalism was historically insufficient for prosperity. The rights of those without administrative power may not have been better protected than the rights of their equivalents in non-constitutional states. The administratively powerful
Polish landlords abused the rights of cities and peasants. The elected assembly prevented urban expansion by prohibiting cities from buying land, and gradually increased taxation on peasants and legally subjugated them to serfdom. In absolutist Russia the situation was not very different.
The Russian peasantry similarly was subjected to serfdom. The main distinction between the two reflects the impact of different distributions of administrative power. In Poland, the landlords gained from serfdom, while in Russia the central government was the major beneficiary.
In fact, constitutionalism can be socially harmful exactly because it is 'good' at fostering intra-elite cooperation. In particular, constitutionalism fosters cooperation among the ruler and the administrators in abusing the rights of the non-elite. Indeed, not long after the English Parliament met for the first time, it approved tripling the poll tax that peasants paid, thereby reducing the elite's tax burden. Similarly, after England's Glorious Revolution (1688), as noted above, some of the greatest property rights abuses in its history occured. Better institutions for the elite do not necessarily imply good institutions for others.
19 Both sides have incentives to introduce reinforcing institutional elements that make a Paretooptimal allocation self-enforcing ex-post. See Greif 1998 Greif , 2006 
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More generally, rulers' incentives to protect the property rights of the non-elites are theoretically ambiguous under either constitutionalism or non-constitutionalism. The issue is how abuse affects the balance of administrative power. On one hand, rulers can benefit from preventing abuse that increases the administrators' power. Indeed, in late medieval Europe, the kings were supposed to, and often did, protect the rights of the non-elite. This summary of Frederic Barbarossa's duty is representative: his duty "was merely to protect all the subjective rights everybody had ... he was supposed to play [the his] role as law protector" (Munz 1969: 100) . Similarly, the Byzantine Emperors enacted laws designed to protect small landholders from larger ones, fearing that land consolidation would undermine the military force provided by the small landholders. The 18 th century Austrian Emperors, Maria Theresa and Joseph II, also reformed the agricultural sector to the benefit of the peasants.
However, when rulers are unable to prevent abuses that increase administrators' power, they can benefit from socially inefficient policies that check that power 20 It may be that this policy was not pursued prior to the Civil War because it could have undermined the parliamentarians' administrative power since the Crown still controlled custom revenues. Commercial expansion would have altered the balance of administrative power in his favor.
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In 17 th century England, by contrast, the parliamentarians were engaged in domestic agriculture, commerce, finance, and industry. Their interests lay in policies that fostered market expansion and internal demand, and following the increase in their power during the Civil Wars of the 17 th century, they implemented policies that supported commercial expansion overseas.
England built the largest Navy in Europe, enacted the Navigation Act, gained control over the seas, and created an Empire. These policies did not initially benefit all Englishmen, but eventually contributed to general prosperity. In England, unlike the Commonwealth, the interests of those with administrative power were in line with the interests of the economy at large.
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Constitutionalism based on administrative power is insufficient for prosperity but has some prosperity-enhancing attributes. Under constitutionalism, the administrators' property rights are explicit and secured and there is an institutionalized way to adjust property rights and policies.
When the administrators are economic agents whose interests are aligned with economic prosperity, their political voice provides information about beneficial policies; their political influence contributes to rendering these policies official; and their administrative capacity fosters the implementation of these policies. When the administrators are military or economic agents whose interests conflict with economic prosperity, though, their voice, influence, and capacity will be welfare reducing under constitutionalism.
The interests of the administrators, in turn, are endogenous to the administrative equilibrium. In particular, when the administrative equilibrium reduces violence and administrative power is diffused, the administrators' interests will shift toward beneficial economic policy. This issue is discussed in Section VI but before turning to it, I discuss the relation between administrative power and violence. Many pre-modern states were established through a process which, if the above conjecture is correct, should have led to high levels of intra-state violence. States often were created by rulers who did not have the resources required to create ruler-controlled administrations but were nevertheless sufficiently talented and charismatic to mobilize tribes, nobles or others who had administrative capacity. This process led to the emergence of the empires of Alexander the Great, Attila the Hun, the Mongols, and the Muslims, among others. As long as such states were expanding, the relatively few military administrators found it beneficial to cooperate. Over time, usually after the death of the first leader, the gains from cooperation would decline as the empire reached its limit, and the interests of administrators would diverge. The administrators would secede, quarrel over the spoils, or fight over leadership.
V. To Revolt or to
For example, upon his death, the empire of Alexander the Great disintegrated as his former generals fought over control. The Mongol Empire, the largest contiguous land empire in history, began expanding in 1206, relying on the military services of multiple Mongol, Turkish and other tribes. It attained its largest area and disintegrated during the 1260s. The history of Russia, presented earlier, exemplifies how powerful administrators at the edge of an Empire contributed to its disintegration. In the late fourteenth century, the Songhai played a similar role in the disintegration of the Mali Empire in Africa.
I am not familiar with a theory articulating the conditions under which powerful administrators cause the state to disintegrate or to cooperate through the state. Yet, it is clear that whether powerful administrators cause the state to disintegrate or maintain some political unity depends on their benefits from cooperation via the state, and on the ruler's ability to mobilize 21 The inability of the local Muslim elite to agree on an alternative ruler facilitated the subsequent conquest of Muslim Spain. I am not familiar with a theory indicating the conditions under which external threats prevent disintegration when there is no legitimate ruler. 22 The Avalon Project, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/golden .htm. For analysis and addition evidence, see Greif 2006 , chapter 8. In Russia, the assembly was rarely able to effectively object or impose its will on the tzars, yet in 1598 and 1613 it appointed the new tzars after the previous dynasty died out. 25 administrators to prevent violence (e.g. secession) by one of them. Disintegration therefore is less likely the higher is the gain from cooperation and the higher is the ruler's legitimacy.
Germany's history illustrates how gains from cooperation through the state are important to maintaining its unity. The Germanic Dukes, mentioned earlier, progressively acquired power and independence. By the end of the Thirty Years War (1648), the German Empire had disintegrated into de facto independent principalities. Yet, the Holy Roman Empire survived until the 19 th century because it provided a means for cooperating in defense. The experience of the Caliphate reflects two reasons that rulers were useful for powerful administrators. First, the succession laws specifying who was entitled to rule prevented intra-state wars over the throne. This role of succession laws is transparent in the Golden Bull (1356) issued by the German Emperor. "We have promulgated, decreed and recommended for ratification the subjoined laws [governing the election of the king who will also be the Emperor] for the purpose of cherishing unity among the electors, and of bringing about a unanimous election, and of closing all approach to the aforesaid detestable discord and to the various dangers which arise from it. 22 " The Golden Bull explicitly named the seven or prince-electors who were to choose the King. Second, kings provided military leadership in confronting external threats. Even the Dutch 23 Such administrations are undermined for at least two reasons. First, the agency problem in ruler-administrator relations reduces the ability to prevent administrators from gaining power. Second, weak administrations are inflexible and 'bureaucratic' because these features reduce the cost of replacing an administrator. They are therefore slow to adjust and the implied ineffectiveness fosters the rise of actors with administrative power. 24 The lack of a legitimate heir also can lead to inter-state wars due to inter-state marriages among royal families. A claimant to the throne could be from another state.
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Republic had a stadtholder who was a de facto hereditary head of state. His main task was to lead the Republic in war.
Relative to powerful administrations, ruler-controlled administrations imply less intrastate violence. Their weak administrators are less able to engage in intra-state violence.
Administrative equilibria with weak administrators are likely to remain self-enforcing in larger set of parameters than those with powerful administrators. Under weak administration, larger changes in relative power are required to make the administrators powerful enough to defy the ruler. (Tilly 1990 ).
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The economic and human cost of inter-state wars is particularly high (for a given technology and administrative equilibrium) when the interests of rulers, administrators, and the masses are aligned by ideology or economic factors. The high costs of modern wars are due partially to nationalism and democracy, which aligned the interests of elite and non-elite.
Ireland's history illustrate this point. During World War I, general conscription was instituted in the United Kingdom, including Ireland. The Catholic Irish, however, supported independence and did not consider it in their interest to fight for the UK. The British recognized that without intrinsic motivation, forcing the Irish to join the army would be counter-productive, so they were not enlisted. 25 A caveat is that rulers might strategically initiate wars to reduce administrative power. 26 The ruler's ability to prevent intra-state violence declines in administrative power, its concentration, and in the extent to which power is based on military administration. The ruler's ability to engage in inter-state violence is higher, the lower is administrative power. 27 Cultural beliefs regarding legitimate actions and loyalty are among the factors that determine whether an equilibrium with social order and security will prevail. Such equilibrium requires that administrators should consider it legitimate that the ruler will punish an administrator who harms others (e.g, by raids, not maintaining roads, or failing to participate in defending the state)
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VI. The Benefit of Mid-Level Administrative Power: Reducing Overall Violence
The conditions under which intra-state or inter-state violence are more prosperity-
reducing have yet to be examined. However, the above discussion suggests that the level of overall violence -and hence its cost -is U-shaped (given the level of external military threat).
Intra-state violence increases with the administrators' power, while inter-states violence increases with the ruler's power (that is, with the administration's weakness). 25 Administrative equilibria thus present a trade-off between intra-state and inter-state violence (that is, between social order and war).
This suggests the argument, developed here, that violence is lowest when the administrators' power is neither too high nor too low (henceforth, 'mid-level'). In seeking to maintain their relative power, each side is motivated to check the violence beneficial to the other.
The ruler (controlled administration) is strong enough to reduce intra-state violence, while the administrators are powerful enough to reduce inter-state violence.
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A necessary condition for such a low-violence equilibrium to exist is that the administrators, as a group, have the power to restrain the ruler, but each is too weak to benefit from initiating intra-state violence. 27 (Greif 1998 (Greif , 2006 were the Ottomans able to militarily subdue all the farmers. (Balla and Johnson 2006; Hickok 1997.) In an administrative equilibrium under which the ruler and administrators constrain each other's actions, their conflicting interests regarding intra-and inter-state violence are endogenous (as mentioned in Section IV). Rulers bear the costs of intra-state violence but benefit from successful inter-state wars through which they gain resources to undermine administrative power.
Recall, for example, the discussion of the Ottomans' success in weakening their administrators after the conquest of Constantinople. Legitimacy enhances rulers' interests in inter-state war by reducing the likelihood that defeat will lead to de-throning.
An empirical evaluation of this argument is yet to be conducted. But we know that powerful administrators often were averse to inter-state wars initiated by their rulers. In late medieval Europe, administrators often refused to finance the 'private' wars of their rulers, although they were willing to finance those for the 'benefit of the community of the realm' to use a phrase common in the sources. The English kings sought loans from Italian bankers to finance the One Hundred Years War they had initiated to regain their personal possessions in France; the French Bourbon Kings had to cut deals with their feudal lords to finance their expansionist wars (Rosenthal 1998) ; and the Spanish Cortes refused to provide Philip II the tax revenues required to build the Grand Armada which he sent to conquer England in 1588.
The administrative balance of power that reduces intra-state violence influences interests in yet another way. Although administrators no longer can gain from intra-state violence, they can gain from the economic opportunities that social order presents. The administrators' interests are transformed by the administrative equilibrium, from specialization in violence to economic activities. Japan's history illustrates this process. When the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1688) was established after a lengthy civil war, it was a bakufu, a 'military government.' Its administrators were men-of-arms, daimyo (lords) and samurai (warriors), and they were legally forbidden to engage in economic activities. The power between the Shogun and his administrators apparently was well-balanced, as the period was remarkably peaceful. However, as time passed, and despite the prohibition, the lords and warriors began engaging in economic activities.
To summarize, intra-and inter-state violence are economically costly. When administrative power is high, intra-state violence is more likely to transpire; if it is too weak, the ruler is more likely to initiate inter-state wars. Mid-level administrative power increases the likelihood of an equilibrium that reduces both intra and inter-state violence. In the long run, such an equilibrium can transform military administrators to economic agents. Moreover, because midlevel administrative power entails constitutionalism, the administrators-turned-economic agents have an institutionalized way to influence policy choices. Economic prosperity is more likely because economic agents have political voice and influence.
The dynamics of such economically beneficial processes, however, can cease if the balance of administrative power supporting a low level of violence fails to hold. This often was the case, arguably because such equilibria depend on a delicate balance of power and hence are often unstable. Temporary shocks in relative power can tilt the balance in favor of either the ruler or the administrators. 28 It seems reasonable that the administrators' ability to prevent any undermining of their power would increase with the uniformity of their interests and their capacity to overcome collective actions and free rider problems. It would decrease in the extent to which the ruler is considered legitimate by those he governs and his tenure being long enough to nurture their loyalty. The creation of a relatively weak administration in France by the Bourbons in the 17th and 18th centuries, for example, was facilitated by the longevity of several monarchs.
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Ottoman history illustrates how temporary shocks in relative power can lead to new equilibria. Initially, the Ottoman Empire followed the common process of relying on powerful administrators -mainly Turkish tribes and clans, in this case -to provide military services. Civil wars were common, particularly upon the death of a Sultan. In 1453, when the Ottomans conquered Constantinople this period ended. The Ottomans gained the resources and prestige to create a military force to balance (at least for a while) that of their Turkish administrators.
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During the upheavals of the 19 th century, several administrators were able to increase their power and to become independent rulers. The most successful of them was Muhammed Ali, known as the founder of the modern Egypt. He was originally the Wāli (viceroy) of Egypt under the Ottoman rule. He later revolted and gained international recognition of his hereditary rights over Egypt in return for not conquering Istanbul.
VII. Administrations, Incentives and Economic Growth
Intensive economic growth depends on the introduction of new economic sectors and technologies, but rulers (as discussed below) tend to make growth-inhibiting choices. This section describes how distinct administrative equilibria provide different incentives to administrators for implementing growth-inhibiting choices. What weakens administrators also provides them with incentives for implement these choices. On the other hand, administrators with mid-level power are likely to have incentives to ignore growth-inhibiting choices, implementing those that are growth-enhancing instead.
Historically, the economic policy choices that rulers made (as well as the choices made by very powerful administrators) were not guided by belief in the feasibility of intensive growth, or a self-regulating market economy. These are relatively recent beliefs that have contributed to modern economic growth and reflect attempts to rationalize it. 29 Although pre-modern rulers often recognized the economic benefits of trade and the security of property rights, the concept of intensive growth did not underpinned their policy choices which therefore did not encourage such growth.
Considerations regarding power and social order probably also led to growth-inhibiting policy choices. Rulers, and more generally the elite, have the most to lose from the rise of new economic groups who might aspire to influence policy choices. New sectors, and more generally economic change that might lead to new groups, are a threat. Finally, the incumbent sectors have the resources to influence policy choice as well as an interest in preventing the rise of competing sectors and technology.
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For these reasons, growth-inhibiting choices were the rule rather than the exception in premodern states. In such diverse states as Spain under the Habsburg and Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate, potentially productive members of society (e.g. nobles), were not allowed to be economically active. In Tokugawa Japan and in China under the Qing Dynasty, subjects were prohibited from trading abroad or immigrating overseas, and alien traders' activities were restricted. Economic and social regulations in the Roman and Ottoman Empires aimed at replicating the pre-existing social and economic orders. Serfdom and other forms of labor restrictions prevailed in Europe well into the modern period, while in the Muslim world (e.g. Kuran 2001 Kuran , 2006 , religious laws restricted contractual forms, the development of a capital market and the formation of corporations.
The puzzling 18 th century European phenomenon of 'Enlightened Absolutism' illustrates how rulers' fear of social change shapes choices, even when the possibility of intensive growth is recognized. During that period of Enlightenment, the possibility of intensive growth, selfregulating markets, and economic progress was recognized. Surprisingly, however, the more absolute European rulers, not the liberals ones, were the first to alter policy choices based on these new ideas. Among them were Charles III of Spain, Joseph II of Austria, and Frederick the 31 By the 19 th century, once intensive growth was better understood, this was no longer the case. European states, Turkey, and Japan made growth-promoting choices partly in response to increasing international competition.
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Great of Prussia. Why was this the case? Although all European rulers were exposed to the Enlightenment, acting on these new ideas was risky. The first attempts to implement them were thus made by rulers who were secured; they had weak administrators who were less likely to challenge them in case of failure.
Theoretically, inter-state competition may lead to the elimination of states with growthinhibiting policies, but usually this was not the case in the pre-modern world. 31 This seems to describe England after the 15 th century Wars of the Roses when the Justices of Peace became administratively important. These Justices were stationary administrators, with administrative responsibility beyond taxation, and whose power depended on the cooperation of their peers. Indeed, the Justices were reluctant to enforce growth-inhibiting policy choices. They administered England's counties until the 19 th century and were responsible for keeping the King's peace. Hence, they were required to enforce the law, fix wages, regulate food supplies and maintain roads, among other duties. Despite this heavy load, the Justices were unpaid. Not surprisingly, they exercised discretion in what they implemented and were more responsive to local needs than to choices made in London.
One local need was to comply with the Old Poor Law, under which local parishes were supposed to finance relief for the poor (through property taxes). The Justices' motivation to care
for the poor went beyond the need to implement the law because paupers threatened the local
order. Yet, paying poor relief implied both paying more taxes and having to collect them. The local administrators, therefore, sought ways to reduce poverty: encouraging the industrialization of their parishes was one way. Early in the Industrial Revolution, though, the legality of employment practices in factories was often dubious at best. The local authorities chose to ignore this illegality. (Postlethwayt, 1776, p. iii. Cited by Nef, 1940, p. 35) .
The failure of individual administrators to implement 'good laws' is not necessarily optimal for administrators as a whole. Although rational for each administrator, it allows for the rise of new economic sectors, which might lead to groups whose interests differed from those of the elites and whose administrative capacity reduced the incumbent elite's power. Indeed, in the long run, the rise of an industrial elite in England weakened the administrative power and political influence of the landed-elite.
Although the entry of new economic sectors might by costly to the incumbent elite, if there are many administrators, each he will not internalize this cost. In late medieval England, for example, many lords found it beneficial to establish cities on their land in order to increase local food demand and the value of their estates. To motivate immigration, the cities were given the right of self governance. While this was beneficial to individual lords, on the national level it led to the rise of cities as powerful administrators.
Ironically, the ability of administrators to overcome collective action problems might actually hinder growth by preventing growth-enhancing choices that are beneficial to each administrator, but not to the group. In any case, administrators who are also economic agents are more likely to implement choices that lead to economic sectors that complement rather than compete, with theirs. These choices are not necessarily beneficial to others, as the administrators seek private gains from their public position. In England during its industrialization, for example, Labor activists were sentenced to be exiled to Australia by the local authorities for demanding that these authorities enforce the English labor laws.
In sum, when the administration is composed of administrators with mid-level power, there are conditions under which they have the capacity and the incentive to implement, or to allow others to implement, (even unauthorized) growth-enhancing choices. Among these conditions are: diffused administrative power; stationary administrators with responsibilities beyond taxation; administrative power that increases with the wealth of those being administered;
and enough administrators to allow for experimentation and non-internalization of the systemwide implications caused by the rise of new groups.
VIII. Political Conflicts, Constitutionalism and Economic Growth
Administrative equilibria influence the nature of political conflicts, namely those aimed at altering the composition of the elite; different political conflicts have distinct economic
implications. This section describes why either powerful or weak administrations tend to lead to intra-elite conflicts over the distribution of existing wealth. Such conflicts tend to be violent and to motivate wasteful pre-emptive measures. Skocpol, 1979. Recall that under powerful administrators, intra-elite conflict can transpire as a means to signal relative power.
33 Even if they don't have administrative power and can be replaced.
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Mid-level administrative power, in contrast, tend to lead to inter-elite conflicts between the elite and an economic group aspiring to join it. 32 The constitutionalism implied by mid-level administrative power provides an institutionalized way of peacefully absorbing the aspiring elite.
The expectations that this would be the case, in turn, motivates the non-elite to pursue new sources of wealth. Because the aspiring elite brings new sources of wealth, Pareto optimal resolutions of the conflict are more likely to exist. Constitutionalism and prosperity are mutually reinforcing.
Weak (ruler-controlled) administrations have a comparative advantage in preventing the emergence of new economic sectors (Section VII) and the associated groups that might challenge the incumbent elite. Inter-elite challenges therefore are less likely, and when they transpire, it is likely to be because of growing desperation among the non-elite. Intra-elite conflicts, however, are more likely because even a ruler with weak administrators has to rely on some inner circle of elites, composed of advisors, top civil administrators, generals, etc. When random events or undermining processes alter the balance of power within this group of inner-elites, intra-elite conflicts transpire. (The same holds in the case of powerful administrators.) Such intra-elite conflicts concern mutually exclusive shares of the same economic pie, and Pareto-improving resolutions are more likely to exist. The only institutionalized way to gain rights is through violence and by capturing the administration.
Economically wasteful intra-elite conflicts also are more likely under a weak administration because it can be captured to serve the interests of a subset of elites. In particular, weak administrations can be captured by those who interact with it on behalf of the ruler. 33 First of all, weak administrators have no power. Each is provided with incentives to implement choices made by those at upper levels in the hierarchy. Second, rulers have to allocate their finite time to many tasks. Hence, they often rely on intermediaries -such as viziers, chancellors, and prime ministers -to form and communicate choices for the administration to implement. Reliance on an intermediary is also necessary when the ruler is unable to govern due to sickness, infancy, or old age. However, an intermediary can use his authority to implement choices that will enable him to become a de-facto or de-jure ruler.
History is indeed rich with examples of intra-elite conflicts for these reasons in states with weak administrations. Consider, for example, the Merovingian dynasty, which was the first to rule the Frankish Kingdom from the fifth to the eighth centuries. Although the administration was initially powerful and provided by the aristocrats, the Merovingians' chief officials, or the Mayors of the Palace, were gradually able to establish and control an alternative military administration.
By controlling it, the Mayors became the de facto rulers and over time, the de-jure rulers. For similar reason, eunuchs were extensively employed in pre-modern administration in such states as Byzantium, China, the Ottoman Empire, and many others.
Another common means of preempting intra-elite conflicts was to provide the inner-elite with rent to motivate them to support the regime. Rent extraction, however, further weakens the incentives for the non-elite to create new wealth. Rent requires exclusivity of membership, which often was hereditary (e.g. Russia) or even meritocratic (e.g. China). Limiting the distribution of rent to a selective elite, or promoting wasteful competition for political posts (Yang 2002), further weakens the incentives to produce new wealth. Over time, limited economic growth and larger population also reduce the rent available to the elite, thereby increasing the likelihood of intraelite conflicts.
Expectations of intra-elite conflict further motivate members of the elite to waste resources in securing their position in the courts, eliminating competition and safeguarding their assets in case they lose power. A vicious cycle of economic stagnation and political conflicts often results. The high costs of such ex-ante responses to expected intra-elite conflicts is suggested by the history of the Muslim waqfs (religious charities). These were established 34 Inter-elite conflict also characterizes Poland's history, as already discussed, but there the administrators were powerful; hence, such conflicts do not reflect the growth-enhancing process associated with mid-level administrators. 38 throughout the Muslim world, usually by members of the elite, for the explicit purpose of providing local public goods. Kuran (2001) noted that members of the elite increasingly created waqfs to protect their assets from confiscation by the state. But why was the elite fearful of the state? Where intra-elite conflicts are common, members of the elite are insecure; this insecurity implies high costs. The waqfs were legally required to invest in real estate, and this led to misallocation of resources which, as noted by Kuran, who Mid-level power, leading to inter-elite conflicts, also leads to constitutionalism (Section II) which provides an institutionalized means for the peaceful resolution of these conflicts.
Constitutionalism implies that the incumbent elite has an institutionalized way of conferring rights to the emerging elite without sacrificing its own position. The inclusion of new groups via constitutionalism is a quantitative, not a qualitative, change.
If inclusion of a new economic elite is the expected outcome, then the prospect of both economic and political rewards motivates the non-elite to create new sources of wealth. The expansion of constitutionalism and economic growth thus are complementary in a given period and reinforce each other over time. This virtuous growth cycle is also more likely where the technology and environment are suitable for developing new sources of wealth (e.g. commerce)
to complement the elite's (e.g. land).
Concluding Comments
Both common sense and historical evidence indicate that administrative power influences the trajectories of political and economic development. Administrative equilibria affect constitutionalism, the composition of the elite, its policy interests, policy choices, the property rights of the non-elite, the nature and level of violence, whether growth-promoting choices (even if unauthorized) are implemented, and whether the expected outcomes of political conflicts are growth-inhibiting or growth-enhancing.
This paper suggests that constitutionalism originated in the need to govern relations between rulers and administrators. A ruler's policy choice is nothing but a wish in the absence of an administration to implement it. Administrators therefore have a comparative advantage in defying rulers, but there are multiple equilibria in the ruler-administrators relations.
Administrative power -the administrators' ability to influence choices by the threat of sanctioning a ruler -increases with the cost of replacing the administrators, while powerful administrators can prevent choices that will reduce the cost of replacing them.
Constitutionalism is a response to administrative power. When administrative power is 'mid-level' and hence ruler-administrators conflicts are costly to both sides, limited government is the equilibrium outcome and constitutionalism is Pareto optimal for them. Constitutional rules, equality before the law, due process before the law and political assemblies all reduce conflicts caused by asymmetric information; they foster cooperation and the aggregation of policy-related information. When the administration is weak (ruler-controlled), it cannot sanction the ruler who thus does not benefit from constitutionalism. When the administrators are very powerful, and hence the ruler cannot sanction them, constitutionalism can still be Pareto optimal by fostering administrators' cooperation against the non-elite or against external threats.
The conjecture that administrative power underpins constitutionalism explains why it was not the deus ex machina of prosperity. It neither necessarily secures the property rights of those without administrative power nor guarantees prosperity-promoting policies. Policy choices are biased by interests in protecting and enhancing power. Indeed, constitutionalism may have an adverse effect on the security of property rights, as it fosters the elite's ability to cooperate in abusing the rights of the non-elite.
Nevertheless, constitutionalism has been positively correlated with prosperity because mid-level administrative power (sufficient for constitutionalism) is more likely to foster prosperity. First, when administrators are economic agents whose interests are aligned with economic growth, constitutionalism provides them with the political voice and influence to pursue these interests. Second, mid-level administrative power reduces violence. High administrative power, particularly in the hands of military administrators, fosters intra-state violence while low administrative power fosters inter-state violence. Under mid-level administrative power, though, an equilibrium with low intra-and inter-state violence can exist.
Administrators are too weak to revolt but strong enough to prevent the ruler from initiating wars that would increase his power. Third, mid-level administrative power transforms military administrators into economic ones. When administrative power is diffused, lower intra-state violence implies a low rate of return on investment in military might.
The fourth reason that mid-level administrative power is conducive to prosperity is its impact on the incentives for implementing growth-inhibiting policy choices. Such choices were common in pre-modern states because of incorrect beliefs about the structure of the economy and concerns about social order and power. Whether growth-inhibiting choices are implemented or not, however, depends on the administrative equilibrium. The means weakening the administrators, also motivate them to implement growth-inhibiting choices and prohibit unauthorized, growth-enhancing actions. In contrast, under certain conditions economic administrators with mid-level power have incentives to implement, or at least not to prevent, growth-enhancing (unauthorized) choices and actions. This is particularly the case for administrators who tax themselves, have broad administrative responsibilities, are based in a particularly locality, and depend on loyalty of and legitimacy among their local peers. Further research is required to develop and evaluate the merit of this comparative interpretation of distinct institutional and economic trajectories. This research will probably benefit from formalization, comparative empirical analyses, and considering the impact of other distinguishing inter-state features, such as geography, the relations between secular and the religious authorities, cultural distinctions (e.g. individualism and collectivism or conceptions of
